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“Even history has forgotten to write 
the story of women”1 
Th e way of women’s study to institutionalization
Abstract Th is study presents discourses and phenomena whose results have induced the examina-
tion of the history of women, eventually the need to discover the confl ict and diff erences between women 
and men. All these have led to the methodology and examination of the diff erently developed identities. 
Th e institutionalization process of women’s studies has promoted the emergence of the concept of social 
gender: gender is also a methodology to examine the domination forms created by men and women, also 
to examine the diff erences between those forms. Th is methodology can be used for examining their forms 
of connection to power as well. Th e way of thinking in social genders has led to historical epistemology, 
that is, to that theory of knowledge, with which we can understand what formation can serve the survival 
of a given – the forms of genders – cultural form. Th e study analyses those phenomena that feminist 
history have ignored, because mainly women’s identity and their development have been examined; and 
those phenomena that have resulted in neglecting important issues, like: how women have determined 
their identity in regard of religion, race etc. At present, the discourse is in process along the so-called, 
‘autonomy or integration’ debate, which debate is one of those important characteristics that form feminist 
studies; in fact, they only strive for recognition to elevate relevant feminist research into academic levels. 
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 1 Lajos Kiss’ quote (1966): Life of Poor People. Művelt Nép Tudományos és Ismeretterjesztő Kiadó, Budapest, 
pg. 275 
1 Discovering women for history – feminist aspirations in the tense of 
‘unity and diversity’
Do women have history? Th is question originally emerged as the title of a volume edited 
by Scott (2001a) calling attention to the problems of disparities between men and women and 
between women and women, and also to the representation of these disparities. During its long 
history, feminism has been struggling with the controversial consequences of disparities that 
arise, on the one hand, from the fact that feminism denies the idea that women would form a 
group based on one common biological property. In their reasoning, anatomy does not mean 
fate, “our mind, soul and citizenship do not have gender”. On the other hand, they have started 
national and international political movements for the right to study and work, for the right to 
vote, and for the right to reproduction claiming that ‘something’ connects them, and not only 
the common experiences of exclusion determine women but the similar social and psychological 
‘feminine’ characteristics as well. Th e feminists’ eff ort to discover women for history reaches far 
and it is a complex and controversial process. Th e mystery of parity-disparity creates a tension 
that the feminists have been facing for a long time when they claim equality with men. Historians 
who have aimed to improve women’s situation have searched the past for centuries to fi nd model 
personalities depending on age and purpose, for example, women scientists, women writers, 
women artists, women politicians. Th ey have collected stories that can refute the theories about 
the incapability of women declared in descriptive literature or law books. “When the argument 
was about education, feminists presented excellent examples to prove that learning did not 
distort femininity and – more radically – gender has nothing to do with how the brain works. 
When women demanded civil rights during the democratic revolution in the 18th century, they 
pointed out women with political abilities like queens or Jeanne d’Arc stating: they should not 
be deprived from political rights because of their gender.” (Scott 2001a. 11.)
❖
Could be there a general, common identity for women if their life conditions and meaning 
of deeds are fundamentally diff erent from the similar features of the modern women? Feminist 
history and history of feminism focus on such unanswered questions, as whether the group of 
women is a unique or radically complex category, whether women belong to a social category that 
existed before history or it is created by history. Th e politics of feminism turns to ‘women’ and 
act in the name of them as if they formed a permanent and easily distinguishable social group, 
as they should be compacted into one coherent political movement. Th ereby, feminism’s history 
is the decrease of diff erences (class, race, gender ethnicity, political religion and socio-economic 
status) in order to form a common female identity (usually against male domination). As long as 
feminist history serves the political objectives of feminism, it takes part in the creation of this 
essential, common female identity.  However, feminist history analyses the conditions that create 
or do not create common female identity in a way: it examines the diff erent environments women 
lived in - and their eff ects, and whether women accepted or refused those behavioural rules that 
societies set up. Th e results of the examinations showed fundamental diff erences between the 
identity attributed to women and identity recognised by women. Th ese identities change over 
time and are diff erent in every society; moreover, they change in the case of the same woman 
depending on the environment. Th e extremely great historical and cultural diff erences between 
women apparently make it impossible that history should treat this social group as a homoge-
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neous group, even the diff erences have a history that can be examined. Th ese diff erences are 
created in a specifi c environment, and “(…) the diff erences create such relations that are usually 
hierarchical in the groups, and make it possible to ignore complexity, contradiction and inner 
inequalities. How and to what extent the diff erences work (with multiple references and meta-
phorical associations) is a question that can be only answered in each example.” (Scott, 2001a. 
9.). In this sense, the history of women does not mean the examination of oppression or heroism, 
it rather means the exploration of how the gender diff erences were used for diff erent social and 
political legitimations and for the formulation and rejection of diff erent social norms. In agree-
ment with Scott’s view, the research should not aim to eliminate diff erences but to discover and 
understand them. Th e feminist history has considered women to be an existing social category 
before history; nevertheless, it has also proved that the existence of this social category changed 
along with history. “We are to realize that if we write women into history, it would necessarily 
bring about the re-defi nition and expansion of traditional defi nitions with historical importance, 
as well as the framework of personal and subjective experience, public and political activities. It 
is not an exaggeration to say that despite the uncertain initial steps, this methodology re-writes 
not only women’s history but history itself.” (Gordon–Buble–Shrom Dye 1976. 89.).
In the 60’s, historians who researched women aimed not only to demonstrate women’s 
presence in the events that formed history but also to fi nd proof that women took active part in 
these events. According to them, if women’s subordination was assured by their invisibility, then 
historians can stimulate emancipatory processes with works on social struggles and political 
achievements that make women visible. By exploring stories about women’s activity, these his-
torians not only presented new information but also created a new point of view and approach 
regarding what we consider history. “When the question arose, why these facts were ignored 
and how these can be understood today, history became more than fact-fi nding. Since the new 
approach to history depends on the historians’ point of view and the question they raise, the 
process of making women visible was no longer a simple search for new facts. Rather, it became 
the exposure of such new interpretations which not only off ered new understandings of politics, 
but that of the changing signifi cance of family and gender.” (Scott 2001a. 13.). With all these, 
historians provided empirical evidence for the persisting diff erences between women thus refu-
ting feminism’s right of a requisite for the homogeneous female unity. Th erefore, the history of 
feminist movements can be mainly interpreted in the context of the tension between unity and 
diversity. Th is confl ict is exemplifi ed by the documented feminist conference held in France 
at the beginning of the 20th century, which was deeply divided by the class issue. Th e debate 
broke out because a proposal was submitted that demanded a day-off  for maids; it was rejected 
on the ground that the maids would work as prostitutes in their free time. As a result, socialist 
accused feminists that they only stood for middle-class women. Th ose who considered women 
as a homogeneous group and feminism as the movement of every women responded, that since 
there were no two female genders, there could not be a bourgeois and a socialist feminism at 
the same time. Here the issue arose that solidarity might never be established between women 
belonging to diff erent classes. 
However, the feminist movements of the second half of the 20th century organised their 
debates and clarifi ed their messages along diversity, that is, they recognised the problem of class 
diff erences. A good example was shown for this, when in the USA, Afro-American women took 
up using the term ‘coloured women’ at the end of the 1970s to emphasise that feminism was so 
obviously “white”. Th ey claimed that race cannot be separate when it comes to interpreting female 
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experience, therefore, irreconcilable diff erences exist between white and non-white women, their 
diff erent needs and interest make establishing a common program impossible. To illustrate this, 
Scott presented a speech made by an African-American poetess in a conference in New York in 
1979: ‘If white America’s feminist theory does not have to deal with the diff erences between us 
and the diff erences in oppression resulting from it; then how you would deal with the fact that 
those women who clean your houses and take care of your children while you are taking part in 
a conference about feminist theory are mostly poor and coloured people. What theory is behind 
racist feminism?” (Scott 2001a. 17.). By the end of the 20th century, the approaches to diversity 
became an important analytical category of feminism, which provides a new type of interpre-
tation framework since it interprets the diff erences and diff erent identities between women in 
relation to certain circumstances and history. As seen before, the history of women is one of those 
topics that history has recognised since the 1970s. Th is short period can be divided into 3 phrases 
and cognitive models (Pet 2001). Th e compensation phase or separation school advocated the 
writing of ‘her story’ instead of ‘his story’ and fought for women’s visibility and that history would 
ever bear women in mind. In this regard, it was time to change Virginia Wolf ’s famous statement 
(“For most of history, Anonymous was a woman”). Works appeared in this phase that dealt with 
the biography of famous women. It was easy to research these women – successful in men’s world 
too –, since there was a relatively rich source of material available. Pető includes those topics in 
this phase that deal with the history of women’s institutes, women’s education and their right 
to vote, furthermore, works dealing with women’s employment, world of paid work and being 
at home, or issues of family and reproduction. Th e criticism of this conception is rooted in “that 
any personality or historical deed becomes positive and signifi cant because of being a woman or 
done by a woman” (Pet 2001. 43.). Th e second phase is the so-called contribution school that 
examines women within sociohistory as a separate social group and it uses the methodology 
of sociohistorical schools like sociology and ethnography. Its signifi cance is that it focuses on a 
particular social group within sociohistory. Th ese two schools led to the institutionalization of 
women’s studies. By the beginning of the 1980s (third phase), the term, social gender emerges, 
which is also a methodology to examine the forms of domination created by men and women, 
what diff erences determine these, and how they relate to power. 
2 “Th e best that has happened to women in science is the birth of women’s 
studies”2
2.1 Social genders in public discourses 
Th e beginning of the conceptual etymology of gender relates to de Beauvoir who fi rst sepa-
rated analytical and political use of biological and social gender in his work with his famous 
statement (one is not born to be a woman, but becomes one) (Beauvoir 1969). Th e primary aim 
of the gender concept was to question the validity of those theoretical explanations that traced 
inequalities between genders back to nature, that is, to biology and consequently considering 
them unchangeable, fatal and deterministic. Th e diff erentiation based on gender is a universal 
phenomenon just like the labour division between genders, yet determining the content of 
 2 Shulamith Reinharz’s thoughts. In “It is important to have our own home” – Andrea Pető talks about women’s 
studies with Professor Shulamith Reinharz. Saturday 22 November 2014
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divided tasks diff ers in each culture (Magyari-Vincze quotes Oakley 2006). Th e emergence of 
this concept was a great step in terms of the development of paradigms that critically analysed 
women’s disadvantageous positions and subordinated status. “But why did not the sense of gender 
mutuality arise? Why does one member of this relationship consider himself absolute essential 
rejecting every kind of comparison to his correlation and determining that otherness as a very 
diff erent being? Why do not women doubt the sovereignty of men? None of the subjects considers 
themselves inherently or spontaneously unimportant; One is not determined by Other by sup-
posing itself to be the Other, it is just the opposite: One determines it as the Other by supposing 
itself to be One. In order to avoid reversal from Other to One, it is necessary for the subject to 
be subordinated to this unknown point of view. “But how come that the woman is willing to get 
subordinated?” (Beauvoir 1969. 13.). Th is question was formulated in this from in 1949. Th e 
duality of genders, as every duality, had generated signifi cant confl icts by that time and these 
confl icts caused signifi cant changes in the public awareness in the fi rst half of the 20th century. 
Beauvoir illustrated this with Bernard Shaw’s well-known saying: “Th e white American who 
has doomed Negros to clean shoes comes to the conclusion that these people are not suitable for 
anything else.”. Beauvoir claims that this creates a regularity, when a person or group of people 
are kept in inferiority, eventually that person becomes inferior indeed. Th e relevant question 
arose whether it should stay this way. In America, in the 1940s, most men considered women’s 
emancipation as a threat to men’s morals and interests. Some men were afraid of female rivals 
as a statement published in one of the contemporary newspapers proved it. A university student 
claimed, “every female university student, who is going to be a doctor or lawyer, steals a place 
from men” (Beauvoir, 1969). It is nothing more than men’s unwavering belief in their preroga-
tives. Nonetheless, the idea already arose that the process of emancipation might damage not 
only economic interests. In general, one aspect of oppression is that the oppressor benefi ts from 
oppression so that even the most miserable can feel themselves superior. As de Beauvoir said in 
this example: in the southern states of the USA “a poor white” could be consoled by at least not 
being a “dirty nigger”, while the rich whites could exploit this kind of pride of the poor; similarly, 
in this period resulting from oppression “even the most middling man could imagine himself 
as a semi-god compared to women”. Still, in the 1940s in America, most men did not enforce 
their social advantages openly. Th ey did not claim clearly that women would be inferior since 
democracy permeated them more than questioning the theory that every human being was equal. 
At the same time however, while men treat women with benevolence and assume same interest, 
they claim the principle of abstract equality, yet they do not acknowledge detailed equality in 
practice. Th erefore, as soon as men are in confl ict the situation changes, men thematise practical 
inequality and formulate a rule to reject theoretical equality. Certain situations prove this, for 
example, when a man claims that his wife is worth no less just because she has no job or does 
not work, since housework is just as important as any other job. Yet, when they start quarrelling, 
the fi rst thing the man cries out is “you would starve to death without me!”. In other words, a 
situation emerges wherein most men honestly proclaim equality between men and women, as 
well as state that women have not a thing to demand, claiming simultaneously that women can 
never be equal with men and women futilely demand that. One of Judith Butler’s thoughts may 
explain this phenomenon (1990): “the relationship between masculine and feminine cannot be 
represented in a marker economic system, in which the masculine represents the closed circle 
of marker and marked. Fairly controversially, de Beauvoir foresaw it coming in her work of ‘Th e 
Second Sex’ when she argued that men cannot settle the issue of women since they would have 
to play both roles of judge and litigant” (Butler 2006. 55.)
Tanulmányok BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E . .86
2.2 Th e social gender in academic discourse
“According to feminist science interpretation, science and scientifi c observations have 
been established on an ideological (sexist) basis that were previously assumed as objective and 
accepted. Scientifi c statements are based on one-sided observations, and draw conclusions and 
generalize over the whole society as well as explanations for power relations, only based on men’s 
experience. Th is ideology has permeated everything and it is present everywhere, ensuring more 
advantageous positions for men, while ignoring the real values, needs and skills of women. Th e 
male-dominated research has distorted reality. Th ey have not accepted problems relating to 
women authentically as women have been considered emotion-controlled.  Only men can be the 
bearers of real creation and knowledge who are capable of independence and objectivity.” (Thun 
1996. 410.). Th e category of social gender is such an organizing principle that determines the 
genders’ relations to each other and to the world as well as to their environment too. Moreover, 
in Th un’s opinion, this is the organizing principle of a particular culture in terms of what power, 
scope of action and privileges it guarantees to the individual through the determination of social 
institutions. She regards knowledge and science to be such power factors and privileges, and she 
considers social determination of knowledge as well as the politics of knowledge and the idealis-
tic nature of it - as basic issues of feminist research. Feminist research places women into the 
focus of research, just as it examines power relations from the point of view of the subordinated 
and oppressed; meanwhile it analyses the gender order of a role in the reproduction of social 
inequalities, which structures situations and experience on individual level (Magyari-Vincze 
2006). Th e research of social gender draws the attention to two things. Th e fi rst, ‘gender’ is a cen-
tral category structuring social inequalities, which determines chances for life and the range of 
available social positions, that is, the relationship of genders has a hierarchical nature on a social 
level (Belinszki 2003). Th e second is that the relationship between social gender and biological 
gender is complex; therefore, it is impossible and misleading to identify biological diff erences 
with diff erent social behaviours, or to trace inequalities to biological roots. Consequently, the 
social gender can also mean that information about women is the information about men as 
well; examining one of the genders includes the examination of the other. It rejects the idea of 
considering spheres separate as means of interpretation, maintaining the idea that separated 
examination of women would perpetuate the myth that experience of one gender does not or only 
marginally relates to the experience of the other gender. Th e term of social gender also denotes 
the social relationships between the genders. Its usage openly rejects biological explanations 
such as the one that fi nds a common ground in the diff erent forms of women’s inferiority by 
that, that women are able to give birth and men have greater physical power. Instead, gender 
becomes the indicator of cultural construction – the indicator of such socially created theories 
that designate the proper female and male roles. Th us, it appears that the subjective identity of 
women and men has only a social origin.
Th e social practice of critical-theoretical basis of gender-specifi c diff erentiation comprises 
moral-philosophical core values such as equality and justice, as well as the demand for the 
enforcement of universal human rights and moral rights. Accordingly, the presence and extent 
of discrimination against women in every sphere of life – including private life – are examined, 
wherever the existence of male-female relationship makes it necessary. Academic disciplines 
(like gender-oriented sociology, science of economics, law, philosophy and ethics, political 
philosophy, literature, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, pedagogy, history, anthropology 
etc.) that examine and criticize relationships between genders are formed in accordance with 
the fi eld of manifestation, types and tools of gender discrimination.
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Th e formation of feminist research is the part of a widely interpretable, critical socio-scien-
tifi c theory (Thun 1996). It primarily raised questions from the perspective of power, economic 
situation, and how it embedded into historical background, then it deducted the conclusion that 
power relations and ideologies -ubiquitous in the whole society - prevail the same way in the 
scientifi c research like in any other social medium. According to Th un, this view challenged 
the status quo that so strongly permeated the world of science promoting the epistemological 
breakthrough that was later unfolded by postmodernism. 
2.3 Women’s studies, gender studies – in higher education
Women’s movements initiated signifi cant changes in institutions of higher education as 
well, with a continuously increasing infl uence on the public life in universities. Women’s studies 
was created in the American and Western European universities in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
later social gender studies was established, whose departments and research centres emerged as 
the result of a unique development process. Th e feminine scientifi c approach arrived in higher 
education from outside. In reaction to civil movements, feminist-minded professors and stu-
dents criticized the content and methods of education at universities, emphasizing that higher 
education was an exceptionally infl uential intermediary and conservator of the patriarchal esta-
blishment by interpreting and representing science unilaterally and exclusively. Th e emergence 
and spread of women’s studies in universities and diff erent researches took place in cascading 
phases of development. In the fi rst phase – the so-called ‘science without women’ –, women were 
basically excluded from both the subject and practice of science. In the second phase – the so-
called ‘add women and shake them together’ – women appeared as the subject of the scientifi c 
analysis. Th is had great importance because women stepped out of invisibility and became the 
subject of scientifi c researches with the help of being the subject; nevertheless, the statements 
and methods of researches still refl ected male bias. In the third phase, women appeared as part 
of the problems concerned or as a kind of subordinate group. In this phase, the emphasis was 
on fi nding and analysing the obstacles limiting women’s and ethnic groups’ scope of motion in 
a society that was fundamentally and palpably characterized by the general and systematical 
discrimination of women embedded in a historical perspective. All three phases lack an essen-
tial change of attitude that would investigate society or scientifi c phenomena through women’s 
experiences (Thun 1996). Th at is why, the fourth phase is important, which fi nally “interprets 
women within their own system of interpretation, starting from their own experiences and using 
their own concepts.” Th is is the phase when being a woman and experiencing as a woman are 
in all respects considered values as well as authentic. Women’s studies as an offi  cial scientifi c 
fi eld developed in the USA and Great Britain in the 1960s and, as seen before, the concept of 
social gender became its central organizing principle. Experiences and thinking of women that 
developed during history became the subject of women’s studies, which is necessary to correct 
the distorted androcentric interpretations of human behaviour, culture and society. Th rough 
this, women’s studies refuses the rigidity of traditional categories and labels, while it insists on 
the fl exibility of interdisciplinary approach. 
Th e University of California in San Diego launched the fi rst offi  cially recognized program 
of women’s studies in 1970. In Europe, women’s studies fi rst appeared in the western countries 
in 1970s as part of the woman’s rights movement. In university courses, the disciplines hosting 
women’s studies were sociology, history and literature. Today, women’s studies is widespread 
everywhere in a broader sense within humanities and natural sciences. Examining the ins-
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titutionalization process of women’s studies in Europe, four phases of development can be 
distinguished. In the fi rst phase – the so-called activist –, women’s studies are embedded in 
the facultative subjects of a key science. In the second phase, women studies is an independent 
discipline, wherein universities off er general and thematic courses, which brings forth a sort of 
interdisciplinary-coordinated course. Th e third phase is dedicated to becoming more professio-
nal when an independent teaching faculty and departmental staff  are appointed and postgra-
duate courses are launched. In the fourth phase, the phase of autonomy, women’s studies is a 
recognized fi eld of science with the same level of autonomy, same fi nancial background and the 
same degree-granting accreditation like the faculty of any other fi eld of science. Silius states that 
(2003), the institutionalization of women’s studies is the most diffi  cult where “typically, structures 
are rigidly fragmented to fi t certain fi elds of science, where the level of university autonomy is 
low, and where a severe political opposition towards woman rights movements exists. (...) Th e 
modular structure of diff erent university degrees, the possibility of interdisciplinary approach, 
as well as the doctrinal and fi nancial support of state feminism (politicians of equality and/or 
female politicians ) facilitate the institutionalization of women’s studies” (Silius 2003. 61.). Th e 
institutionalization of women’s studies has not yet been fully accomplished in any country, only 
a few countries have an independent faculty led by a women’s studies professor. Remarkably, 
women’s studies is probably the only subject in higher education that has been institutionalized 
entirely by women – female academicians have fought for the development of the subject, feminist 
female researchers have launched the fi rst courses and women have fought for the discipline to 
be accepted by universities. In Katalin Koncz’s summary, women’s studies is “(...) the feminist 
science of describing-analysing women’s situation. In an approach of science history, it is a stage 
in the organization of disciplines of a feminist perspective into an interdisciplinary science. Many 
consider sciences and arts cultivated by women as parts of women’s studies because they contain 
concepts about the world formed by women. Th e subject of its examinations is the female gender, 
although it eventually collides with men, in every question during its analysis. (...) Although 
women’s studies is aware of this, it ‘only’ focuses on understanding the female gender’s status 
and only includes men in its examinations as a basis for comparison. Th us, it tries to pay back 
those debts of science, which make the process of scientifi c understanding more complete by 
unfolding women’s actual status and mapping the reasons for their discrimination” (Koncz 2005. 
126.). Th e experience of developed countries shows that the institutionalization of gender studies 
provides a number of advantages on one hand, as material resources get allocated for fi nancing, 
and a considerable infrastructure (courses, specializations, professorship, and so on) gets built 
around it. On the other hand, its development has taken a path which has closed it up,” meaning 
that researchers of this topic have remained among themselves. Th ey discuss their research 
results in isolation in the women’s section of conferences, they publish one for the other in their 
own professional journals, and consequently, the published information hardly fi nds its way to a 
wider audience. On one hand, this means the construction of a narrow scientifi c perspective; on 
the other hand, it carries the political risk of giving an impression of an interest representation 
embedded in science, or in other words, researches dealing with women or social genders are 
easily accused of misandry, especially if aimed at examining and proving social inequalities. 
All this has been formulated along the ‘autonomy or integration?’ debate, which is one of the 
most important characteristics that form feminist studies, and its most vital goal is to actually 
gain recognition for feminist researches amongst academic societies. Integration strategy aims 
to introduce women’s point of view and the perspective of relations between genders to every 
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discipline and academic program, in a way that it highlights sensitivity towards diff erences and 
inequalities between genders and highlights gender awareness during the discussion of every 
social problem. Still, the arguments raised against integration are warning that feminist research 
will or may lose its radical potential due to its integration into a conservative institution. Th at is 
why, autonomist strategy is more desirable which attempts to create independent programs. Th is 
is none other than the strategy of establishing a new type of discipline and academic structure, 
which questions the traditional establishment of universities. Th e main arguments put forward 
against autonomy point out the dangers and negative consequences of ghettoization and the 
stigmatization of committing misandry.
2.4 Research methods and epistemology of women’s studies
Feminist theories and research methods have endeavoured to deconstruct the previously 
uniform social category of ‘the woman’. In consequence, a revolutionary conclusion have been 
reached – which therefore causes a lot of controversy – that states “one can reach more realistic 
knowledge and describe reality more precisely if one examines women’s cultural and social sta-
tuses in a way, that as a starting point, one assumes that there are diff erences between women 
and so there is heterogeneity. We only get a real image of ourselves if we examine the roots of 
these diff erences together with the consequences in the cross section of diff erent social defi nitions. 
Women’s studies claim to have great importance of coeffi  cient consequences rooted in gender 
affi  liation and in belonging to an ethnic or social group” (Thun 2002. 2.). Diff erent theories have 
emerged over the years connected to gender-based research methods. Harding (1987) assumes 
that these should be investigated on three levels, from three viewpoints: research methods, 
research methodology, and epistemological questions. One determinative idea for researches 
highlighted the perceived experiences of women, and the most appropriate ways for that are 
the so-called qualitative methods. Th e criticism of this approach articulates the importance of 
quantitative methods (among others), because through quantitative methods, information and 
data expressing the social occurrence and distribution of an examined problem can be exposed 
to show its importance. According to these arguments, statistics oft en have a greater convincing 
power than narratives that investigate reports.  Th e third approach assumes that the combined 
application of the two methods is the most effi  cient.
A signifi cant issue in the methodology of gender-based researches is how to formulate 
our questions, how to use our methods and how to use the results of our research. Researches 
of this kind usually ask questions in connection to women and the hierarchical relationship 
between genders, and the questions are drawn from real life and examined from the subordi-
nate’s perspective. However, such a research may not necessarily intend to make theories, but 
instead to draw attention to social problems connected to the investigated phenomena, to react 
and suggest solutions to them. It is essential that the created knowledge should have a direct 
social benefi t, it should bring a change into people’s lives through pointing out, for example, how 
hierarchical relationships could be turned into partnerships, how social exclusion or gender-
based (and other kind of) discrimination could be eliminated. Harding (1987) analyses three 
major gender-based epistemological branches: the empirical, the standpoint, the postmodern 
feminist epistemologies. According to her statements, the empirical branch developed during the 
period when the question of how to create their legitimacy among sciences stood in the centre 
of feminist researches. Among their principles, she mentions the pursuit of objectivity, neutral 
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data acquisition and showing the truth from women’s point of view. Th e attitude according 
to which feminists can describe women’s experiences better just because they experience the 
same events was called a naive concept by Harding. Perspective epistemology sets the Hegelian 
explanation in the centre, which claims that scientists and researchers dealing with women in 
subordinate situations are capable of identifying the problems because they achieve it from a 
privileged situation in some respect. Th is situation is the perspective of the subordinate subject, 
who, due to their situation, has a clearer view on reality than the one in superordinate position, 
and therefore not interested in changing the status quo or in recognizing the injustices of the 
world. Harding’s third group is dedicated to postmodern epistemologies. Th is school eradicates 
the objectivist idea of scientism in the way of questioning the possibility of a universal, the 
existence of absolute truth, and explains that feminist knowledge is just another one of reality’s 
possible representations. As a result of all this, a question (later answered by Haraway 1991) 
arises: the question of why the feminist knowledge would be any better, any more valid or any 
more legitimate than any non-feminist or even masculine knowledge about the same topic (e.g. 
considering relationships between genders). Haraway (1991) starts her argument with stating 
that the dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism should be resolved. Because, she 
believes that the fact that we always perceive reality from a certain position or, in other words, 
subjectively does not necessarily mean that we could not be objective as well; therefore we may 
be capable of arranging our knowledge in relation to all other kinds of knowledge. In addition to 
these, the contrast of relativism and absolutism should also be resolved because we do not build 
our knowledge on the approach of one or the other; instead, we always produce partial, localized 
knowledge. Haraway’s opinion therefore is none other than the epistemology of partial perspec-
tives that reinterprets both subjectivity and objectivity, defi ning this latter clearly as the only 
possible localized knowledge, which is responsible and at the same time accountable compared 
to the principles that it clearly expresses and raises awareness for them. Many people say that 
this type of epistemology combines the immobility of scientism with the social responsibility 
for the generated knowledge most eff ectively.
Summary
Overall, research results employing feminist epistemology have created woman-based 
science. Th e thesis of the determining role of gender affi  liation has entered the organizing 
principles of science from the point of view of both researcher and researched. As Thun (2002) 
summarizes it, “(…) women’s and gender studies has performed three ‘great tasks’ during the 
past twenty years.
a) It has corrected the fact-fi ndings of social sciences, humanities, even natural sciences to 
some extent, also corrected theories about ‘the human being’: it integrated women’s knowledge 
about themselves and the world as a part of scientifi c discipline. b) It has done enormous explo-
ratory work, created a system of new data sources about women’s role and status in culture and 
society – as a result of historical and comparative researches. c) It has created a new scientifi c 
paradigm, a new framework for interpretation and reference. Th ereby, it has modifi ed and crea-
tively improved the scientifi c thinking in structure as well as in content. It has not only expanded 
traditional, ‘masculine’ science, but pulled down its rigid framework and intended to recreate 
it in a polyphonic way, that is: to integrate and broadcast the values accumulated by gender and 
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women’s studies to other fi elds of science through interdisciplinarity” (Thun 2002. 3.). Studies 
about women legitimize certain dialogue methods about women and relationships between 
genders, and they increase women’s chances to live in a society that considers gender equality 
discourse and practice as natural and normal. According to Scott (2001), the phrase ‘social gender’ 
is a synonym for the word ‘woman’ in its simplest usage. In some cases this wording, although it 
only faintly refers to certain analytic terms, in fact marks the acceptability of this fi eld of science 
from a political perspective. In this case, the usage of the phrase social gender serves as an indi-
cation of the scientifi c basis for a work, because social gender is more neutral and objective than 
‘women’. “Social gender is easier to insert into scientifi c terminology, thus it becomes separated 
from the feminist policy oft en believed to be shrill. What is more, it does not carry the inevitable 
declarations of inequality and authority, and it does not specify the off ended party. Th e usage 
of the phrase social gender signifi es a phase that can be formulated as the period of the feminist 
science seeking for its rightful academic place in the 1980s.” (Scott 2001. 130.)  ❋
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